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Abstract
We present information-theoretic definitions and results for analyzing symmetric-key en-
cryption schemes beyond the perfect secrecy regime, i.e. when perfect secrecy is not attained.
We adopt two lines of analysis, one based on lossless source coding, and another akin to rate-
distortion theory. We start by presenting a new information-theoretic metric for security, called
ǫ-symbol secrecy, and derive associated fundamental bounds. This metric provides a parame-
terization of secrecy that spans other information-theoretic metrics for security, such as weak
secrecy and perfect secrecy. We then introduce list-source codes (LSCs), which are a general
framework for mapping a key length (entropy) to a list size that an eavesdropper has to resolve
in order to recover a secret message. We provide explicit constructions of LSCs, and show that
LSCs that achieve high symbol secrecy also achieve a favorable tradeoff between key length and
uncertainty list size. We also demonstrate that, when the source is uniformly distributed, the
highest level of symbol secrecy for a fixed key length can be achieved through a construction
based on minimum-distance separable (MDS) codes. Using an analysis related to rate-distortion
theory, we then show how symbol secrecy can be used to determine the probability that an eaves-
dropper correctly reconstructs functions of the original plaintext. More specifically, we present
lower bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error of estimating a target function of the plain-
text given that a certain set of functions of the plaintext is known to be hard (or easy) to infer,
either by design of the security system or by restrictions imposed on the adversary. We illustrate
how these bounds can be applied to characterize security properties of symmetric-key encryp-
tion schemes, and, in particular, extend security claims based on symbol secrecy to a functional
setting. Finally, we discuss the application of our methods in key distribution, storage and
privacy.
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1 Introduction
The security properties of a communication scheme can, in general, be evaluated from two funda-
mental perspectives: information theoretic and computational. For a noiseless setting, uncondi-
tional (i.e. perfect) information-theoretic secrecy can only be attained when the communicating
parties share a random key with entropy at least as large as the message itself [3]. Consequently,
usual information-theoretic approaches focus on physically degraded models [4], where the goal is
to maximize the secure communication rate given that the adversary has a noisier observation of
the message than the legitimate receiver. On the other hand, computationally secure cryptosys-
tems have thrived both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. Such systems are based on
yet unproven hardness assumptions, but nevertheless have led to cryptographic schemes that are
widely adopted (for an overview, see [5]). Currently, computationally secure encryption schemes
are used millions of times per day, in applications that range from online banking transactions to
digital rights management.
Computationally secure cryptographic constructions do not necessarily provide an information-
theoretic guarantee of security. For example, one-way permutations and public-key encryption can-
not be deemed secure against an adversary with unlimited computational resources. This is not to
say that such primitives are not secure in practice – real-world adversaries are indeed computation-
ally bounded. There are, however, cryptographic schemes that are believed to be computationally
secure and simultaneously provide some security guarantee against computationally unbounded
adversaries, albeit such guarantee is not absolute secrecy. This was noted by Shannon [3] and later
by Hellman [6] in a companion paper to his and Diffie’s work “New directions in Cryptography”
[7].
Our goal in this work is to characterize the fundamental information-theoretic security prop-
erties of cryptographic schemes when perfect secrecy is not attained. We follow the footsteps of
Shannon and Hellman and study symmetric-key encryption with small keys, i.e. when the length
of the key is smaller than the length of the message. In this case, the best a computationally
unrestricted adversary can do is to decrypt the ciphertext with all possible keys, resulting in a list
of possible plaintext messages. The adversary’s uncertainty regarding the original message is then
represented by a probability distribution over this list. This distribution, in turn, depends on both
the distribution of the key and the distribution of the plaintext messages.
We evaluate the information-theoretic security in this setting through two complementary lines
of analysis: (i) one based on lossless source coding, where the security properties of the uncertainty
list are measured using mutual information-based metrics and secure communication schemes are
provided based on linear code constructions, and (ii) another akin to rate-distortion theory, where
the mutual information-based metrics are translated into restrictions on the inference capabilities
of the adversary through converse results. We describe each approach below.
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1.1 Lossless Source Coding Approach
If perfect secrecy is not achieved, then meaningful metrics are required to quantify the level of
information-theoretic security provided by a cryptographic scheme. We define a new metric for
characterizing security, ǫ-symbol secrecy, which quantifies the uncertainty of specific source sym-
bols given an encrypted source sequence. This metric subsumes traditional rate-based information-
theoretic measures of secrecy which are generally asymptotic [4]. However, our definition is not
asymptotic and, indeed, we provide a construction that achieves fundamental symbol secrecy
bounds, based on maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, for finite-length sequences. We note
that there has been a long exploration of the connection between coding and cryptography [8], and
our work is inscribed in this school of thought.
We also introduce a general source coding framework for analyzing the fundamental information-
theoretic properties of symmetric-key encryption, called list-source codes (LSCs). LSCs compress a
source sequence below its entropy rate and, consequently, a message encoded by an LSC is decoded
to a list of possible source sequences instead of a unique source sequence. We demonstrate how any
symmetric-key encryption scheme can be cast as an LSC, and prove that the best an adversary can
do is to reduce the set of possible messages to an exponentially sized list with certain properties,
where the size of the list depends on the length of the key and the distribution of the source. Since
the list has a size exponential in the key length, it cannot be resolved in polynomial time in the key
length, offering a certain level of computational security. We characterize the achievable ǫ-symbol
secrecy of LSC-based encryption schemes, and provide explicit constructions using algebraic coding.
1.2 Rate-Distortion Approach
While much of information-theoretic security has considered the hiding of the plaintext, crypto-
graphic metrics of security seek to hide also functions thereof [9]. More specifically, cryptographic
metrics characterize how well an adversary can (or cannot) infer functions of a hidden variable, and
are stated in terms of lower bounds for average estimation error probability. This contrasts with
standard information-theoretic metrics of security, which are concerned with the average number of
bits that an adversary learns about the plaintext. Nevertheless, as shown here, restrictions on the
average mutual information can be mapped to lower bounds on average estimation error probability
through rate-distortion formulations.
Using a rate-distortion based approach, we extend the definition of ǫ-symbol secrecy in order to
quantify not only the information that an adversary gains about individual symbols of the source
sequence, but also the information gained about functions of the encrypted source sequence. We
prove that ciphers with high symbol secrecy guarantee that certain functions of the plaintext are
provably hidden regardless of computational assumptions. In particular, we show that certain
one-bit function of the plaintext (i.e. predicates) cannot be reliably inferred by the adversary.
We illustrate the application of our results both for hiding the source data and functions thereof.
We provide an extension of the one-time pad [3] to a functional setting, demonstrating how certain
classes of functions of the plaintext can be hidden using a short key. We also consider the privacy
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against statistical inference setup studied in [10], and show how the analysis introduced here sheds
light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff.
From a practical standpoint, we investigate the problem of secure content caching and distribu-
tion. We propose a hybrid encryption scheme based on list-source codes, where a large fraction of
the message can be encoded and distributed using a key-independent list-source code. The infor-
mation necessary to resolve the decoding list, which can be much smaller than the whole message,
is then encrypted using a secure method. This scheme allows a significant amount of content to be
distributed and cached before dealing with key generation, distribution and management issues.
1.3 Related work
Shannon’s seminal work [3] introduced the use of statistical and information-theoretic metrics
for analyzing secrecy systems. Shannon characterized several properties of conditional entropy
(equivocation) as a metric for security, and investigated the effect of the source distribution on the
security of a symmetric-key cipher. Shannon also considered the properties of “random ciphers”,
and showed that, for short keys and sufficiently long, non-uniformly distributed messages, the
random cipher is (with high probability) breakable: only one message is very likely to have produced
a given ciphertext. Shannon defined the length of the message required for a ciphertext to be
uniquely produced by a given plaintext as the unicity distance.
Hellman extended Shannon’s approach to cryptography [6] and proved that Shannon’s random
cipher model is conservative: A randomly chosen cipher is likely to have small unicity distance,
but does not preclude the existence of other ciphers with essentially infinite unicity distance (i.e.
the plaintext cannot be uniquely determined from the ciphertext). Indeed, Hellman argued that
carefully designed ciphers that match the statistics of the source can achieve high unicity distance.
Ahlswede [11] also extended Shannon’s theory of secrecy systems to the case where the exact source
statistics are unknown.
The problem of quantifying not only an eavesdropper’s uncertainty of the entire message but
of individual symbols of the message was studied by Lu in the context of additive-like instanta-
neous block ciphers (ALIB) [12–14]. The results presented here are more general since we do not
restrict ourselves to ALIB ciphers. More recently, the design of secrecy systems with distortion
constraints on the adversary’s reconstruction was studied by Schieler and Cuff [15]. We adopt
here an alternative approach, quantifying the information an adversary gains on average about the
individual symbols of the message, and investigate which functions of the plaintext an adversary
can reconstruct. Our results and definitions also hold for the finite-blocklength regime.
Tools from algebraic coding have been widely used for constructing secrecy schemes [8]. In
addition, the notion of providing security by exploiting the fact that the adversary has incomplete
access to information (in our case, the key) is also central to several secure network coding schemes
and wiretap models. Ozarow and Wyner [16] introduced the wiretap channel II, where an adversary
can observe a set k of his choice out of n transmitted symbols, and proved that there exists a code
that achieves perfect secrecy. A generalized version of this model was investigated by Cai and
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Yeung in [17], where they introduce the related problem of designing an information-theoretically
secure linear network code when an adversary can observe a certain number of edges in the network.
Their results were later extended in [18–21]. A practical approach was presented by Lima et al. in
[22]. For a survey on the theory of secure network coding, we refer the reader to [23].
The list-source code framework introduced here is related to the wiretap channel II in that a
fraction of the source symbols is hidden from a possible adversary. Oliveira et al. investigated in
[24] a related setting in the context of data storage over untrusted networks that do not collude,
introducing a solution based on Vandermonde matrices. The MDS coding scheme introduced in
this paper is similar to [24], albeit the framework developed here is more general.
List decoding techniques for channel coding were first introduced by Elias [25] and Wozencraft
[26], with subsequent work by Shannon et al. [27, 28] and Forney [29]. Later, algorithmic results
for list decoding of channel codes were discovered by Gurusuwami and Sudan [30]. We refer the
reader to [31] for a survey of list decoding results. List decoding has been considered in the context
of source coding in [32]. The approach is related to the one presented here, since we may view a
secret key as side information, but [32] did not consider source coding and list decoding together
for the purposes of security.
The use of rate-distortion formulations in security and privacy settings was studied by Ya-
mamoto [33] and Reed [34]. Information-theoretic approaches to privacy that take distortion into
account were also considered in [10,35–37].
1.4 Notation
Throughout the paper capital letters (e.g. X and Y ) are used to denote random variables, and
calligraphic letters (e.g. X and Y) denote sets. All the random variables in this paper have a
discrete support set, and the support set of the random variables X and Y are denoted by X and
Y, respectively. For a positive integer j, k, n, j ≤ k, [n] , {1, . . . , n}, [j, k] , {j, j + 1, . . . , k}.
Matrices are denoted in bold capital letters (e.g. H) and vectors in bold lower-case letters (e.g.
h). A sequence of n random variables X1, . . . ,Xn is denoted by X
n. Furthermore, for J ⊆ [n],
XJ ,
(
Xi1 , . . . ,Xi|J |
)
where ik ∈ J and i1 < i2 < · · · < i|J |. Equivalently, for a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn), x
J ,
(
xi1 , . . . , xi|J |
)
. For two vectors x, z ∈ Rn, we denote by x ≤ z the
set of inequalities {xi ≤ zi}ni=1. Furthermore, we denote by In(t) the set of all subsets of [n] of size
t, i.e. J ∈ In(t)⇔ J ⊆ [n] and |J |= t.
All the logarithms in the paper are in base 2. We denote the binary entropy function as
hb(x) , −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x).
The inverse of the binary entropy function is the mapping h−1b : [0, 1]→ [0, 1/2] where
h−1b (h(x)) =
x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/21− x, otherwise.
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The set of all unit variance functions of a random variable X with distribution pX (denoted by
X ∼ pX) is given by
L2(pX) , {φ : X → R such that ‖φ(X)‖2= 1, X ∼ pX} ,
where ‖φ(X)‖2,
√
E [φ(X)2].
The operators TX and TY denote conditional expectation and, in particular, (TX ◦ g)(x) =
E [g(Y )|X = x] and (TY ◦ f)(y) = E [f(X)|Y = y], respectively. For two random variables X and
Y , the minimum-mean-squared error (MMSE) of estimating X from an observation of Y is given
by
mmse(X|Y ) , min
X→Y→Xˆ
E
[
(X − Xˆ)2
]
.
1.5 Communication and threat model
A transmitter (Alice) wishes to transmit confidentially to a legitimate receiver (Bob) a sequence
of length n produced by a discrete source X with alphabet X and probability distribution pX .
We assume that the communication channel shared by Alice and Bob is noiseless, but is observed
by a passive, computationally unbounded eavesdropper (Eve). Both Alice and Bob have access
to a shared secret key K drawn from a discrete alphabet K, such that H(K) < H(Xn), and
encryption/decryption functions Enc : X n ×K →M and Dec :M×K → X n, where M is the set
encrypted messages. Alice observes the source sequence Xn, and transmits an encrypted message
M = Enc(Xn,K). Bob then recovers Xn by decrypting the message using the key, producing
Xˆn = Dec(M,K). The communication is successful if Xˆn = Xn. We consider that the encryption
is closed [3, pg. 665], so Dec(c, k1) 6= Dec(c, k2) for k1, k2 ∈ K, k1 6= k2. We assume Eve knows the
functions Enc and Dec, but does not know the secret key, K. Eve’s goal is to gain knowledge about
the original source sequence.
1.6 Organization of the paper
1.6.1 Symbol secrecy
We introduce the definitions of absolute and ǫ-symbol secrecy in Section 2. Symbol secrecy quan-
tifies the uncertainty that an eavesdropper has about individual symbols of the message.
1.6.2 Encryption with key entropy smaller than the message entropy
We present the definition of list-source codes (LSCs), together with fundamental bounds, in Section
3. Practical code constructions of LSCs are introduced in Section 4. We then analyze the symbol
secrecy properties of LSCs in Section 5.
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1.6.3 A Rate-Distortion View of Symbol Secrecy
In Section 6 we introduce results for characterizing the information leakage of a security system
in terms of functions of the original source data. In particular, we derive converse bounds for
the minimum-mean-squared error (MMSE) of estimating a target function of the plaintext given
that certain functions of the plaintext are known to be hard (or easy) to infer. We illustrate the
application of these bounds in a generalization of the one-time pad. We also use these results to
bound the probability of error of estimating predicates of the plaintext given that a certain level of
symbol secrecy is achieved.
1.6.4 Further applications and practical considerations
Section 7 presents further applications of our results to security and privacy, together with prac-
tical considerations of the proposed secrecy framework. Finally, Section 8 presents our concluding
remarks.
2 Symbol Secrecy
In this section we define ǫ-symbol secrecy, an information-theoretic metric for quantifying the
information leakage from security schemes that do not achieve perfect secrecy. Given a source
sequence Xn and a random variable Z dependent of Xn, ǫ-symbol secrecy is the largest fraction
t/n such that, given Z, at most ǫ bits can be learned on average from any t-symbol subsequence of
Xn. We also prove an ancillary lemma that bounds the average mutual information between Xn
and Z in terms of symbol secrecy.
Definition 1. Let Xn be a random variable with support X n, and Z be the information that leaks
from a security system (e.g. the ciphertext). Denoting XJ = {Xi}i∈J , we say that pXn,Z achieves
an ǫ-symbol secrecy of µǫ(X
n|Z) if
µǫ(X
n|Z) , max
{
t
n
∣∣∣∣ I(XJ ;Z)|J | ≤ ǫ ∀J ⊆ [n], 0 < |J |≤ t
}
. (1)
In particular, the absolute symbol secrecy of Xn from Y is given by
µ0(X
n|Z) , max
{
t
n
∣∣∣∣ I(XJ ;Z) = 0 ∀J ⊆ [n], 0 < |J |≤ t} . (2)
We also define the dual function of symbol-secrecy for Xn and Z as:
ǫ∗t (X
n|Z) , inf {ǫ ≥ 0 |µǫ(Xn|Z) ≥ t/n} . (3)
The next examples illustrate a few use cases of symbol secrecy.
Example 1. Symbol secrecy encompasses other definitions of secrecy, such as weak secrecy [38],
strong secrecy [39] and perfect secrecy. For example, given two sequences of random variables
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Xn and Zn, if µǫ(X
n|Zn) → 1 for all ǫ > 0, then I(Xn;Zn)n → 0. The converse is not true, as
demonstrated in Example 3 below. Furthermore, I(Xn;Zn) = 0 if and only if µ0(X
n|Zn) = 1.
Finally, the reader can verify that I(Xn;Zn) → 0 if and only if there exists a sequence ǫn = o(n)
such that µǫn(X
n|Zn)→ 1.
Example 2. Consider the case where X = {0, 1}, Xn is uniformly drawn from X n, and Z is the
result of sending Xn through a discrete memoryless erasure channel with erasure probability α.
Then, for any J ⊆ [n], J 6= ∅,
I(XJ ;Z)
|J | = (1− α),
and, consequently,
µǫ(X
n|Z) =
0, for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1− α,1, ǫ ≥ 1− α.
Example 3. Now assume again that Xn is a uniformly distributed sequence of n bits, but now
Z = X1. This corresponds to the case where one bit of the message is always sent in the clear, and
all the other bits are hidden. Then, for any J ⊆ [n] such that {1} ∈ J ,
I(XJ ;Z) = 1,
and, for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1,
µǫ(X
n|Z) = 0.
Consequently, a non-trivial symbol-secrecy cannot be achieved for ǫ < 1. In general, if a symbol
Xi is sent in the clear, then a non-trivial symbol secrecy cannot be achieved for ǫ < H(Xi). Note
that I(Xn;Z)/n→ 0, so weak secrecy is achieved.
Example 4. We now illustrate how symbol secrecy does not necessarily capture the information
that leaks about functions of Xn. We address this issue in more detail in Section 6. Still assuming
that Xn is a uniformly distributed sequence of n bits, let Y be the parity bit of Xn, i.e. Z =∏n
i=1(−1)Xi . Then, for any J ( [n],
I(XJ ;Z) = 0,
and, for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1,
µǫ(X
n|Z) = n− 1
n
,
and, for ǫ ≥ 1, µǫ(Xn|Z) = 1.
The following lemma provides an upper bound for I(Xn;Z) in terms of µǫ(X
n|Z) when Xn is
the output of a discrete memoryless source.
Lemma 1. Let Xn be the output of a discrete memoryless source X, and Z a noisy observation of
Xn. For any ǫ such that 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ H(X), if µǫ(Xn|Z) = u∗, then
1
n
I(Xn;Z) ≤ H(X)− u∗(H(X) − ǫ). (4)
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Proof. Let µǫ(X
n|Z) = u∗ , t/n, J ∈ In(t) and J¯ = [n]\J . Then
1
n
I(Xn;Z) =
1
n
I(XJ ;Z) +
1
n
I(XJ¯ ;Z|XJ )
≤ t
n
(
ǫ+
1
t
I(XJ¯ ;Z|XJ )
)
≤ u∗ǫ+ (n− t)
n
H(X)
= H(X) − u∗(H(X) − ǫ),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of symbol secrecy, and the second inequal-
ity follows from the assumption that the source is discrete and memoryless and, consequently,
I(XJ¯ ;Z|XJ ) ≤ H(XJ¯ |XJ ) = (n − t)H(X).
The previous result implies that when µǫ(X
n|Z) is large, only a small amount of information
about Xn can be gained from Z on average. However, even if I(Xn;Z) is large, as long as µǫ(X
n|Z)
is non-zero, the uncertainty about Xn given Z will be spread throughout the individual symbols
of the source sequence. This property is desirable for symmetric-key encryption and, as we shall
show in Section 6, can be extended to determine which functions of Xn can or cannot be reliably
inferred from Z. Furthermore, in Section 5 we introduce explicit constructions for symmetric-
key encryption schemes that achieve a provable level of symbol secrecy using the list-source code
framework introduced next.
3 LSCs
In this section we present the definition of LSCs and derive fundamental bounds. We also demon-
strate how any symmetric-key encryption scheme can be mapped to a corresponding list-source
code.
3.1 Definition and Fundamental Limits
We introduce the definition of list-source codes is given below.
Definition 2. A (2nR, |X |nL, n)-LSC (fn, gn,L) consists of an encoding function fn : X n 7→
[
2nR
]
and a list-decoding function gn,L :
[
2nR
] 7→ P(X n)\∅, where P(X n) is the power set of X n and
|gn,L(w)|= |X |nL ∀w ∈
[
2nR
]
. The value R is that rate of the LSC, L is the normalized list size,
and |X |nL is the list size.
Note that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1. From an operational point of view, L is a parameter that determines the
size of the decoded list. For example, L = 0 corresponds to traditional lossless compression, i.e.,
each source sequence is decoded to a unique sequence. Furthermore, L = 1 represents the trivial
case when the decoded list corresponds to X n.
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Figure 1: Rate list region for normalized list size L and code rate R.
For a given LSC, an error is declared when a string generated by a source is not contained in
the corresponding decoded list. The average error probability is given by
e(fn, gn,L) , Pr(X
n /∈ gn,L(fn(Xn))). (5)
Definition 3. For a given discrete memoryless source X, the rate list size pair (R,L) is said
to be achievable if for every δ > 0, 0 < ǫ < 1 and sufficiently large n there exists a sequence
of (2nRn , |X |nLn , n)-list-source codes {(fn, gn,Ln)}∞n=1 such that Rn < R + δ, |Ln − L|< δ and
e(fn, gn,Ln) ≤ ǫ. The rate list region is the closure of all rate list pairs (R,L).
Definition 4. The rate list function R(L) is the infimum of all rates R such that (R,L) is in the
rate list region for a given normalized list size 0 ≤ L ≤ 1.
Theorem 1. For any discrete memoryless source X, the rate list function is given by
R(L) = H(X)− L log|X | . (6)
Proof. Let δ > 0 be given and {(fn, gn,Ln)}∞n=1 be a sequence of codes with (normalized) list size
Ln such that Ln → L and for any 0 < ǫ < 1 and n sufficiently large 0 ≤ e(fn, gn,Ln) ≤ ǫ. Then
Pr
(
Xn ∈
⋃
w∈Wn
gn,Ln(w)
)
≥ Pr (Xn ∈ gn,Ln(fn(Xn))) (7)
≥ 1− ǫ (8)
where Wn = [2nRn ] and Rn is the rate of the code (fn, gn,Ln). There exists n0(δ, ǫ, |X |) where if
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n ≥ n0(δ, ǫ, |X |), then
Rn + Ln log|X | = 1
n
log
(
2nRn |X |nLn)
=
1
n
log
( ∑
w∈Wn
|gn,Ln(w)|
)
≥ 1
n
log
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
w∈Wn
gn,Ln(w)
∣∣∣∣∣
≥ H(X)− δ, (9)
where the last inequality follows from [40, Lemma 2.14]. Since this holds for any δ > 0, it follows
that R(L) ≥ H(X) − L log|X | for all n sufficiently large.
We prove achievability next. Let 0 < L < 1 be given, and let Ln , ⌊nL⌋. Furthermore, let Xn
be a sequence of n source symbols, and denote XnLn the first nLn source symbols and X
[nLn+1,n]
the last n(1−Ln) source symbols where we assume, without loss of generality, that nL is an integer.
Then, from standard source coding results [41, pg. 552], for any ǫ > 0 and n sufficiently large, and
denoting αn , ⌈nLn(H(X)+ ǫ)⌉/n, βn , ⌈n(1−Ln)(H(X)+ ǫ)⌉/n, there are (surjective) encoding
functions
f1nL : X nLn → [2nαn ] and f2n(1−Ln) : X n(1−Ln) → [2nβn ],
and corresponding (injective) decoding functions
g1n,1 : [2
nαn ]→ X nLn and g2n,1 : [2nβn ]→ X nLn
such that Pr(g1n,1(f
1
nLn
(XnLn)) 6= XnLn) ≤ O(ǫ) and Pr(g2n,1(f2n(1−Ln)(X(1−Ln)n)) 6= X(1−Ln)n) ≤
O(ǫ).
For w ∈ [2nβn ] and x ∈ X n, let the list-source coding and decoding functions be given by
fn(x) , f
2
n(1−Ln)
(x[nLn+1,n]) and
gn,L˜n(w) , {x ∈ X
n : ∃v ∈ [2nαn ] such that (f1nL(x[nL]), f2n(1−L)(x[nL+1,n])) = (v,w)},
respectively. Then
Pr
(
Xn ∈ g
n,L˜n
(fn(X
n))
)
≥ Pr
(
g1n,1(f
1
nL(X
Ln)) = XLn ∧ g2n,1(f2n(1−L)(X(1−L)n)) = X(1−L)n
)
≥ 1−O(ǫ).
Observe that the rate-list pair achieved by (fn, gn,L˜n) is (Rn, L˜n) = (βn, αn/log|X |)). Conse-
quently,
Rn ≤ (1− Ln)(H(X) + ǫ) + n−1
≤ H(X) + ǫ− αn
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= H(X) + ǫ− L˜n log|X |,
where the second inequality follows from αn ≤ Ln(H(X) + ǫ) + n−1. Observe that Rn → n(1 −
L)H(X) + ǫ , R. Since L˜n → L(H(X) + ǫ)/log|X |, L˜ as n→∞, by choosing n sufficiently large
the rate-list pair (R, L˜) can be achieved, where R and L˜ satisfy
R ≤ H(X) + ǫ− L˜ log|X |.
Since ǫ is arbitrary and L˜ can span any value in [0,H(X)/log|X |], it follows that R(L) ≤ H(X)−
L log|X |.
3.2 Symmetric-Key Ciphers as LSCs
Let (Enc,Dec) be a symmetric-key cipher where, without loss of generality, M = [2nR] and Enc :
X n × K → M and Dec : M× K → X n. Then an LSC can be designed based on this cipher by
choosing k′ from K and setting the encoding function fn(x) = Enc(x, k′), where x ∈ X n, and
gn,L(fn(x)) = {z ∈ X n : ∃k ∈ K such that Enc(z, k) = fn(x)},
where L satisfies |K|= |X |nL. If the key is chosen uniformly from K then the decoded list corre-
sponds set of possible source sequences that could have generated the ciphertext. The adversary’s
uncertainty will depend on the distribution of the source sequence Xn.
Alternatively, symmetric-key ciphers can also be constructed based on an (2nR, |X |nL, n)-list-
source code. Let (fn, gn,L) be the corresponding encoding/decoding function of the LSC, and
assume that the key is drawn uniformly from K = [|X |nL], where the normalized list size L deter-
mines the length of the key. Without loss of generality, we also assume that Alice and Bob agree on
an ordering of X and, consequently, X n can be ordered using the corresponding dictionary ordering.
We denote pos(x) the position of the source sequence x ∈ X in the corresponding list gn,L(fn(x)),
where pos : X n → [|X |nL].
The cipher can then be constructed by letting the message set beM′ = [2nR]× [|X |nL] and, for
x ∈ X n and k ∈ K,
Enc(x, k) = (fn(x), (pos(x) + k) mod |K|).
For (a, b) ∈M′, the decryption function is given by
Dec((a, b), k) = {x : fn(x) = a, pos(x) = (b− k) mod |K|}.
In this case, an eavesdropper that does not know the key k cannot recover the function pos(x) and,
consequently, her uncertainty will correspond to the list gn,L(fn(x)).
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4 LSC design
In this section we discuss how to construct LSCs that achieve the rate-list tradeoff (6) in the
finite block length regime. As shown below, an LSC that achieves good rate-list tradeoff does
not necessarily lead to good symmetric-key encryption schemes. This naturally motivates the
constructions of LSCs that achieve high symbol secrecy.
4.1 Necessity for code design
Assume that the source X is uniformly distributed in Fq, i.e., Pr(X = x) = 1/q ∀x ∈ Fq. In this
case R(L) = (1− L) log q. A trivial scheme for achieving the list-source boundary is the following.
Consider a source sequence Xn = (Xp,Xs), where Xp denotes the first p = n−⌊Ln⌋ symbols of Xn
and Xs denotes the last s = ⌊Ln⌋ symbols. Encoding is done by discarding Xs, and mapping the
prefix Xp to a binary codeword Y nR of length nR = ⌈n−⌊Ln⌋ log q⌉ bits. This encoding procedure
is similar to the achievability scheme used in the proof of Theorem 1.
For decoding, the codeword Y nR is mapped to Xp, and the scheme outputs a list of size qs
composed by Xp concatenated with all possible combinations of suffixes of length s. Clearly, for n
sufficiently large, R ≈ (1− L) log q, and we achieve the optimal list-source size tradeoff.
The previous scheme is inadequate for security purposes. An adversary that observes the
codeword Y nR can uniquely identify the first p symbols of the source message, and the uncertainty
is concentrated over the last s symbols. Assuming that all source symbols are of equal importance,
we should spread the uncertainty over all symbols of the message. Given the encoding f(Xn), a
sensible security scheme would provide I(Xi; f(X
n)) ≤ ǫ ≪ log q for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can naturally
extend this notion for groups of symbols or functions over input symbols, which is what symbol
secrecy captures.
4.2 A construction based on linear codes
Let X be an i.i.d. source with support X and entropy H(X), and (sn, rn) a source code for X with
encoder sn : X n → Fmnq and decoder rn : Fmnq → X n. Furthermore, let C be a (mn, kn, d) linear
code1 over Fq with an (mn − kn)×mn parity check matrix Hn (i.e. c ∈ C ⇔ Hnc = 0). Consider
the following scheme, where we assume
kn , nLn log|X |/log q
is an integer, 0 ≤ Ln ≤ 1 and Ln → L as n→∞.
Scheme 1. Encoding : Let xn ∈ X n be an n-symbol sequence generated by the source. Compute
the syndrome σn through the matrix multiplication
σn , Hnsn(xn)
1For an overview of linear codes an related terminology, we refer the reader to [42].
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and map each syndrome to a distinct sequence of nR = ⌈(mn − kn) log q⌉ bits, denoted by ynR.
Decoding : Map the binary codeword ynR to the corresponding syndrome σn. Output the list
gn,Ln(σn) =
{
rn(z)
∣∣z ∈ Fmnq , σn = Hnz} .
Theorem 2. If a sequence of source codes {(sn, rn)}∞n=1 is asymptotically optimal for source X,
i.e. mn/n→ H(X)/log q with vanishing error probability, scheme 1 achieves the rate list function
R(L) for source X.
Proof. Since the cardinality of each coset corresponding to a syndrome σn is exactly
|gn,Ln(σn)|= qkn ,
the normalized list size is
Ln = log|X | q
kn = (kn log q)/(n log|X |).
By assumption, Ln → L as n → ∞. Denoting mn/n = H(X)/log q + δn, where δn → 0 since the
source code is assumed to be asymptotically optimal, it follows that the rate of the LSC is
Rn = ⌈(mn − kn) log q⌉/n
= ⌈(H(X) + δn log q)n− Lnn log|X |⌉/n
→ H(X)− L log|X |,
which is arbitrarily close to the rate in (6) for sufficiently large n.
The source coding scheme used in the proof of Theorem 2 can be any asymptotically optimal
scheme. Note that if the source X is uniformly distributed in Fq, then Ln = kn/n and any message
in the coset indexed by σn is equally likely. Hence, Rn = (n − k) log q/n = H(X) − L log q, which
matches the upper bound in (6). Scheme 1 provides a constructive way of hiding information, and
we can take advantage of the properties of the underlying linear code to make precise assertions
regarding the security of the scheme.
With the syndrome in hand, how can we recover the rest of the message? One possible approach
is to find a kn × n matrix Dn that has full rank such that the rows of Dn and Hn form a basis of
Fmnq . Such a matrix can be easily found, for example, using the Gram-Schmidt process with the
rows of Hn as a starting point. Then, for a source sequence xn, we simply calculate tn = Dnxn
and forward tn to the receiver through a secure channel. The receiver can then invert the system(
Hn
Dn
)
xn =
(
σn
tn
)
, (10)
and recover the original sequence xn. This property allows list-source codes to be deployed in
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practice using well known linear code constructions, such as Reed-Solomon [42, Chap. 5] or Random
Linear Network Codes [43, Chap. 2].
Remark 1. This approach is valid for general linear spaces, and holds for any pair of full rank
matrices Hn and Dn with dimensions (mn − kn) × mn and kn × mn, respectively, such that
rank([HTn D
T
n ]
T ) = mn. However, here we adopt the nomenclature of linear codes since we make
use of known code constructions to construct LSCs with provable symbol secrecy properties in the
next section.
Remark 2. The LSC described in scheme 1 can be combined with other encryption methods,
providing, for example, an additional layer of security in probabilistic encryption schemes ([5, 9]).
A more detailed discussion of practical applications is presented in Section 7.
5 Symbol Secrecy of LSCs
We next present fundamental bounds for the amount of symbol secrecy achievable by any LSC
considering a discrete memoryless source. Since any encryption scheme can be cast as an LSC,
these results quantify the amount of symbol secrecy achievable by any symmetric-key encryption
scheme that encrypts a discrete memoryless source.
Lemma 2. Let {(fn, gn)}∞n=1 be a sequence of list-source codes that achieves a rate-list pair (R,L)
and an ǫ-symbol secrecy of µǫ
(
Xn|Y nRn)→ µǫ as n→∞. Then 0 ≤ µǫ ≤ min{ L log|X |H(X)−ǫ , 1}.
Proof. We denote µǫ(X
n|Y nR) = µǫ,n. Note that, for J ⊆ [n] and |J |= nµǫ,n,
I(XJ ;Y nRn) = H(XJ )−H(XJ |Y nRn)
= nµǫ,nH(X)−H(XJ |Y nRn)
≤ nµǫ,nǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of symbol secrecy and I(XJ ;Y nRn) ≤ |J |ǫ =
nµǫ,nǫ. Therefore
µǫ,n(H(X) − ǫ) ≤ 1
n
H(XJ |Y nRn)
≤ Ln log|X |.
The result follows by taking n→∞.
The previous result bounds the amount of information an adversary gains about particular
source symbols by observing a list-source encoded message. In particular, for ǫ = 0, we find a
meaningful bound on what is the largest fraction of input symbols that is perfectly hidden.
The next theorem relates the rate-list function with ǫ-symbol secrecy through the upper bound
in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 3. If a sequence of list-source codes {(fn, gn,Ln)}∞n=1 achieves a point (R′, L) with
µǫ(X
n|Y nRn)→ L log|X |H(X)−ǫ , cǫ for some ǫ, where R′ = limn→∞ 1nH(Y nRn), then R′ = R(L).
Proof. Assume that {(fn, gn,Ln)}∞n=1 satisfies the conditions in the theorem and δ > 0 is given.
Then for n sufficiently large, we have from (4):
1
n
H(Y nRn) =
1
n
I(Xn;Y nRn)
≤ H(X)− cǫ(H(X) − ǫ) + δ
= H(X)− L log|X |+δ.
Since this holds for any δ, then R′ ≤ H(X) − L log|X |. However, from Theorem 1, R′ ≥ H(X) −
L log|X |, and the result follows.
5.1 A scheme based on MDS codes
We now prove that for a uniform i.i.d. source X in Fq, using scheme 1 with an MDS parity check
matrix H achieves µ0. Since the source is uniform and i.i.d., no source coding is used.
Proposition 1. If H is the parity check matrix of an (n, k, d) MDS code and the source Xn is
uniform and i.i.d., then Scheme 1 achieves the upper bound µ0 = L, where L = k/n.
Proof. Let C be the set of codewords of an (n, k, n − k + 1) MDS code over Fq with parity matrix
H, and let x ∈ C. Fix a set J ∈ In(k) of k positions of x, denoted xJ . Since the minimum
distance of C is n − k + 1, for any other codeword in z ∈ C we have zJ 6= xJ . Denoting by
CJ = {xJ ∈ Fkq : x ∈ C}, then |CJ |= |C|= qk. Therefore, CJ contains all possible combinations of
k symbols. Since this property also holds for any coset of H, the result follows.
6 A Rate-Distortion View of Symbol Secrecy
Symbol secrecy provides a fine-grained metric for quantifying the amount of information that leaks
from a security system. However, standard cryptographic definitions of security are concerned not
only with what an eavesdropper learns about individual symbols of the plaintext, but also which
functions of the plaintext an adversary can reliably infer. In order to derive analogous information-
theoretic metrics for security, in this section we take a step back from the symmetric-key encryption
setup and study the general estimation problem of inferring properties of a hidden variable X from
an observation Y . More specifically, we derive lower bounds for the error of estimating functions of
X from an observation of Y . By using standard converse results (e.g. Fano’s inequality [41, Chap.
2]), symbol secrecy guarantees are then translated to guarantees on how well certain functions of
the plaintext can or cannot be estimated.
We first derive converse bounds for the minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE) of estimating a
function φ of the hidden variable X given Y . We assume that the MMSE of estimating a set of
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functions Φ , {φj(X)}mi=1 given Y is known, as well as the correlation between φj(X) and φ(X).
Bounds for the MMSE of φ(X) are then expressed in terms of the MMSE of each φj(X) and the
correlation between φ(X) and φj(X). We also apply this result to the setting where φ and φj are
binary functions, and present bounds for the probability of correctly guessing φ(X) given Y . These
results are of independent interest, and are particularly useful in the security setting considered
here.
The set of functions Φ can be used to model known properties of a security system. For example,
when X is a plaintext and Y is a ciphertext, the functions φj may represent certain predicates of
X that are known to be hard to infer given Y . In privacy systems, X may be a user’s data and Y a
distorted version ofX generated by a privacy preserving mechanism. The set Φ could then represent
a set of functions that are known to be easy to infer from Y due to inherent utility constraints of
the setup. In particular, as will be shown in Section 6.4, we will consider the functions in Φ as the
individual symbols of the plaintext. In this case, the results introduced in this section are used to
derive bounds on the MMSE of reconstructing a target function of the plaintext in terms of the
symbol-secrecy achieved by the underlying list-source code given by the encryption scheme. This
result extends symbol secrecy to a broader setting.
6.1 Lower Bounds for MMSE
The results introduced in this section are based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let zn : (0,∞)n × [0, 1]n → R be given by
zn(a,b) , max
{
aTy
∣∣y ∈ Rn, ‖y‖2≤ 1,y ≤ b} . (11)
Let π be a permutation of (1, 2, . . . , n) such that bπ(1)/aπ(1) ≤ . . . ≤ bπ(n)/aπ(n). If bπ(1)/aπ(1) ≥
1, zn(a,b) = ‖a‖2. Otherwise,
zn(a,b) =
k∗∑
i=1
aπ(i)bπ(i)
+
√√√√(‖a‖22− k∗∑
i=1
a2π(i)
)(
1−
k∗∑
i=1
b2π(i)
)
(12)
where
k∗ , max
k ∈ [n]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
bπ(k)
aπ(k)
≤
√√√√√
(
1−∑k−1i=1 b2π(i))+
‖a‖22−
∑k−1
i=1 a
2
π(i)
 . (13)
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
Throughout this section we assume Φ ⊆ L2(pX) and E [φi(X)φj(X)] = 0 for i 6= j. Furthermore,
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let Y be an observed variable that is dependent of X, and for a given φi the inequality
max
ψ∈L2(pY )
E [φi(X)ψ(Y )] = ‖E [φi(X)|Y ] ‖2≤ λi
is satisfied, where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1. This is equivalent to mmse(φi(X)|Y ) ≥ 1− λ2i .
Theorem 4. Let |E [φ(X)φi(X)] |= ρi > 0. Denoting ρ , (|ρ1|, . . . , |ρm|), λ , (λ1, . . . , λm),
ρ0 ,
√
1−∑ki=1 ρ2i , λ0 = 1 ρ0 , (ρ0,ρ) and λ0 , (λ0,λ), then
‖E [φ(X)|Y ] ‖2≤ B|Φ|(ρ0,λ0), (14)
where
B|Φ|(ρ0,λ0) ,
z|Φ|+1 (ρ0,λ0) , if ρ0 > 0,z|Φ|(ρ,λ), otherwise. (15)
and zn is given in (11). Consequently,
mmse(φ(X)|Y ) ≥ 1−B|Φ|(ρ0,λ0)2. (16)
Proof. Let h(X) , ρ−10 (φ(X) −
∑
i ρiφi(X)) if ρ0 > 0, otherwise h(X) = 0. Note that h(X) ∈
L2(pX). Then for ψ ∈ L2(pY )
|E [φ(X)ψ(Y )]| =
∣∣∣∣∣ρ0E [h(X)ψ(Y )] +
m∑
i=1
ρiE [φi(X)ψ(Y )]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ρ0 |E [h(X)ψ(Y )]|+
m∑
i=1
|ρiE [φi(X)ψ(Y )]|
= ρ0 |E [h(X)(TXψ)(X)]|+
m∑
i=1
|ρiE [φi(X)(TXψ)(X)]| .
Denoting |E [h(X)(TXψ)(X)] |, x0, |E [φi(X)(TXψ)(X)] |, xi, x , (x0, x1, . . . , xm), and ρ ,
(ρ0, |ρ1|, . . . , |ρm|), the last inequality can be rewritten as
|E [φ(X)ψ(Y )]| ≤ ρT0 x. (17)
Observe that ‖x‖2≤ 1 and xi ≤ λi for i = 0, . . . ,m, and the right hand side of (17) can be
maximized over all values of x that satisfy these constraints. We assume, without loss of generality,
that ρ0 > 0 (otherwise set x0 = 0). The left-hand side of (17) can be further bounded by
|E [φ(X)ψ(Y )]| ≤ zm+1(ρ0,λ0), (18)
where λ = (1, λ1, . . . , λm) and zm+1 is defined in (11). The result follows directly from Lemma 3
and noting that maxψ∈L2(pY ) E [φ(X)ψ(Y )] = ‖E [φ(X)|Y ] ‖2.
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Denote ψi , TY φi/‖TY φi‖2 and φ0(X) , (φ(X) −
∑m
i=1 ρiφi(X))/ρ
−1
0 . The previous bound
can be further improved when E [ψi(Y )φj(X)] = 0 for i 6= j, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}.
Theorem 5. Let |E [φ(X)φi(X)] |= ρi > 0 for φi ∈ Φ. In addition, assume E [ψi(Y )ψj(Y )] = 0
for i 6= j, i ∈ [t] and j ∈ {0, . . . , |Φ|}, where 0 ≤ t ≤ |Φ|. Then
‖E [φ(X)|Y ] ‖2≤
√√√√ t∑
k=1
λ2i ρ
2
i +B|Φ|−t
(
ρ˜, λ˜
)2
, (19)
where ρ˜ = (ρ0, ρt, . . . , ρm), λ˜ = (1, λt, . . . , λm) and Bm is defined in (15) (considering B0 = 0). In
particular, if t = m,
‖E [φ(X)|Y ] ‖2≤
√√√√ρ20 + |Φ|∑
k=1
λ2i ρ
2
i , (20)
and this bound is tight when ρ0 = 0. Furthermore,
mmse(φ(X)|Y ) ≥ 1−
t∑
k=1
λ2i ρ
2
i −B|Φ|−t
(
ρ˜, λ˜
)2
. (21)
Proof. For any ψ ∈ L2(pY ), let αi , E [ψ(Y )ψi(Y )] and ψ0(Y ) , (ψ(Y )−
∑t
i=1 αiψi(Y ))α
−1
0 , where
α0 = (1 −
∑t
i=i α
2
i )
−1/2. Observe that ψ0 ∈ L2(pY ) and E [φi(X)ψj(Y )] = E [ψi(Y )ψj(Y )] = 0 for
i 6= j, i ∈ {0, . . . , |Φ|} and j ∈ [t]. Consequently
E [φ(X)ψ(Y )] = E
 |Φ|∑
i=0
ρiφi(X)
 t∑
j=0
αjψj(Y )

=
|Φ|∑
i=0
t∑
j=0
ρiαjE [φi(X)ψj(Y )]
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣α0
|Φ|∑
i=0,i/∈[n]
ρiE [φi(X)ψ0(Y )]
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
t∑
i=1
|λiρiαi|
≤ |α0|B|Φ|−t
(
ρ˜, λ˜
)
+
t∑
i=1
|λiρiαi| (22)
≤
√√√√ t∑
i=1
λ2i ρ
2
i +B|Φ|−t
(
ρ˜, λ˜
)2
. (23)
Inequality (22) follows from the bound (14), and (23) follows by observing that
∑t
i=0 α
2
i = 1 and
applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Finally, when ρ0 = 0, (23) can be achieved with equality by taking ψ =
∑
i
λiρi√∑
i λ
2
i ρ
2
i
ψi.
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The following three, diverse examples illustrate different usage cases of Theorems 4 and 5.
Example 5 illustrates Theorem 5 for the binary symmetric channel. In this case, the basis Φ can
be conveniently expressed as the parity bits of the input to the channel. Example 6 illustrates how
Theorem 5 can be applied to the q-ary symmetric channel, and demonstrates that bound (20) is
sharp. Finally, Example 7 then illustrates Theorem 4 for the specific case where all the values ρi
and λi are equal.
Example 5 (Binary Symmetric Channel). Let X = {−1, 1} and Y = {−1, 1}, and Y n be the result
of passing Xn through a memoryless binary symmetric channel with crossover probability ǫ. We
also assume that Xn is composed by n uniform and i.i.d. bits. For S ⊆ [n], let χS(Xn) ,
∏
i∈S Xi.
Any function φ : X → R can then be decomposed in terms of the basis of functions χS(Xn) as [44]
φ(Xn) =
∑
S⊆[n]
cSχS(X
n),
where cS = E [φ(X
n)χS(X
n)]. Furthermore, since E [χS(X
n)|Y n] = (1 − 2ǫ)|S|, it follows from
Theorem 5 that
mmse(φ(Xn)|Y n) = 1−
∑
S⊆[n]
c2S(1− 2ǫ)2|S|. (24)
This result can be generalized for the case where Xn = Y n ⊗ Zn, where the operation ⊗ denotes
bit-wise multiplication, Zn is drawn from {−1, 1}n and Xn is uniformly distributed. In this case
mmse(φ(Xn)|Y n) = 1−
∑
S⊆[n]
c2SE [χS(Z
n)]2 . (25)
This example will be revisited in Section 6.3, where we restrict φ to be a binary function.
Example 6 (q-ary symmetric channel). For X = Y = [q], an (ǫ, q)-ary symmetric channel is defined
by the transition probability
pY |X(y|x) = (1− ǫ)1y=x + ǫ/q. (26)
Any function φi ∈ L2(pX) such that E [φi(X)] = 0 satisfies
ψi(Y ) = TY φ(X) = (1− ǫ)φ(Y ),
and, consequently, ‖TY φ(X)‖2= (1−ǫ). We shall use this fact to show that the bound (20) is sharp
in this case.
Observe that for φi, φj ∈ L2(pX), if E [φi(X)φj(X)] = 0 then E [ψi(Y )ψj(Y )] = 0. Now let
φ ∈ L2(pX) satisfy E [φ(X)] = 0 and E [φ(X)φi(X)] = ρi for φi ∈ Φ, where |Φ|= m, Φ satisfies the
conditions in Theorem 5, and
∑
i ρ
2
i = 1. In addition, ‖ψi‖2= (1− ǫ) = λi. Then, from (20),
‖TY φ(X)‖2 ≤
√√√√ m∑
i=1
λ2i ρ
2
i
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= (1− ǫ)
√∑
i
ρ2i
= 1− ǫ,
which matches ‖TY φ(X)‖2, and the bound is tight in this case.
Example 7 (Equal MMSE and correlation). We now turn our attention to Theorem 4. Consider
the case when the correlations of φ with the references functions φi are all the same, and each φi
can be estimated with the same MMSE, i.e. λ1 = · · · = λm = λ and ρ21 = · · · = ρ2m = ρ2, ρ ≥ 0 and
λ2 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 1/m. Then bound (14) becomes
‖E [φ(X)|Y ] ‖2≤ mλρ+
√
(1−mρ2)(1−mλ2).
6.2 One-Bit Functions
Let X be a hidden random variable and Y be a noisy observation of X. Here we denote Φ = {φi}mi=1
a collection of m predicates of X, where Fi = φi(X), φi : X → {−1, 1} for i ∈ [m] and, without
loss of generality E [Fi] = bi ≥ 0.
We denote by Fˆi an estimate of Fi given an observation of Y , where Fi → X → Y → Fˆi. We
assume that for any Fˆi ∣∣∣E[FiFˆi]∣∣∣ ≤ 1− 2αi
for some 0 ≤ αi ≤ (1−bi)/2 ≤ 1/2. This condition is equivalent to imposing that Pr{Fi 6= Fˆi} ≥ αi,
since
E
[
FiFˆi
]
= Pr{Fi = Fˆi} − Pr{Fi 6= Fˆi}
= 1− 2Pr{Fi 6= Fˆi}.
In particular, this captures how well Fi can be guessed based solely on an observation of Y .
Now assume there is a bit F = φ(Y ) such that E [FFi] = ρi for i ∈ [m] and E [FiFj ] = 0 for
i 6= j. We can apply the same method used in the proof of Theorem 4 to bound the probability of
F being guessed correctly from an observation of Y .
Corollary 1. For λi = 1− 2αi,
Pr(F 6= Fˆ ) ≥ 1
2
(
1−B|Φ|(ρ,λ)
)
. (27)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as Theorem 4, φ(Y ) ∈ L2(pY ).
In the case m = 1, we obtain the following simpler bound, presented in Proposition 2, which
depends on the following Lemma.
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Lemma 4. For any random variables A,B and C
Pr(A 6= B) ≤ Pr(A 6= C) + Pr(B 6= C).
Proof.
Pr(A 6= B) = Pr(A 6= B ∧B = C) + Pr(A 6= B ∧B 6= C)
= Pr(A 6= C ∧B = C) + Pr(B 6= C) Pr(A 6= B|B 6= C)
≤ Pr(A 6= C) + Pr(B 6= C).
Proposition 2. If Pr(F1 6= Fˆ1) ≥ α for all Fˆ1 and E [FF1] = ρ ≥ 0. Then for any estimator Fˆ
Pr(F 6= Fˆ ) ≥
(
1− ρ
2
− α
)+
. (28)
Proof. From Lemma 4:
Pr(F 6= Fˆ ) ≥
(
Pr(F1 6= F )− Pr(F1 6= Fˆ )
)+
≥
(
1− ρ
2
− α
)+
.
6.3 One-Time Pad Encryption of Functions with Boolean Inputs
We return to the setting where a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to communicate a plaintext
message Xn to a legitimate receiver (Bob) through a channel observed by an eavesdropper (Eve).
Both Alice and Bob share a secret key K that is not known by Eve. Alice and Bob use a symmetric
key encryption scheme determined by the pair of encryption and decryption functions (Enc,Dec),
where Y n = Enc(Xn,K) and Xn = Dec(Y n,K). Here we assume that both the ciphertext and the
plaintext have the same length.
We use the results derived in the previous section to assess the security properties of the one-
time pad with non-uniform key distribution when no assumptions are made on the computational
resources available to Eve. In this case, perfect secrecy (i.e. I(Xn;Y n) = 0) can only be achieved
when H(K) ≥ H(Xn) [3], which, in turn, is challenging in practice. Nevertheless, as we shall show
in this section, information-theoretic security claims can still be made in the short key regime, i.e.
H(K) < H(Xn). We first prove the following ancillary result.
Lemma 5. Let F be a Boolean random variable and F → X → Y → Fˆ , where |Y|≥ 2. Further-
more, Pr{F 6= Fˆ} ≥ α for all Y → Fˆ . Then I(F ;Y ) ≤ 1− 2α.
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Proof. The result is a direct consequence of the fact that the channel with binary input and finite
output alphabet that maximizes mutual information for a fixed error probability is the erasure
channel, proved next. Assume, without loss of generality, that Y = [m] and pF,Y (−1, y) ≥ pF,Y (1, y)
for y ∈ [k] and pF,Y (−1, y) ≤ pF,Y (1, y) for y ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m}, where k ∈ [m]. Now let Y˜ be a
random variable that takes values in [2m] such that
p
F,Y˜
(b, y) =

pF,Y (b, y) − pF,Y (1, y) y ∈ [k],
pF,Y (b, y) − pF,Y (−1, y) y ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m},
pF,Y (1, y) y −m ∈ [k],
pF,Y (−1, y) y −m ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,m}.
.
Note that F → Y˜ → Y , since Y = Y˜ − m1{Y˜ >m} and, consequently, I(F ; Y˜ ) ≥ I(F ;Y ).
Furthermore, the reader can verify that
min
Y→Fˆ
Pr{F 6= Fˆ} = min
Y˜→Fˆ
Pr{F 6= Fˆ} = α.
In particular, given the optimal estimator Y˜ → Fˆ , a detection error can only occur when Y˜ ∈
{k + 1, . . . ,m}, in which case Fˆ = F with probability 1/2.
Finally,
H(F |Y˜ ) = −
∑
b∈{−1,1}
y∈[2m]
p
Y˜
(y)p
F |Y˜
(b|y) log p
F |Y˜
(b|y)
=
∑
y∈{m+1,2m}
p
Y˜
(y)
≥ 2α.
Consequently, I(F ; Y˜ ) = H(F )−H(F |Y˜ ) ≤ 1− 2α. The result follows.
Let Xn be a plaintext message composed by a sequence of n bits drawn from {−1, 1}n. The
plaintext can be perfectly hidden by using a one-time pad: A ciphertext Y n is produced as Y n =
Xn ⊗ Zn, where the key K = Zn is a uniformly distributed sequence of n i.i.d. bits chosen
independently from Xn. The one-time pad is impractical since, as mentioned, it requires Alice and
Bob to share a very long key.
Instead of trying to hide the entire plaintext message, assume that Alice and Bob wish to hide
only a set of functions of the plaintext from Eve. In particular, we denote this set of functions as
Φ = {φ1, . . . , φm} where φi : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, E [φi(Xn)] = 0 and E [φi(Xn)φj(Xn)] = 0. The
set of functions Φ is said to be hidden I(φi(X
n);Y n) = 0 for all φi ∈ Φ. Can this be accomplished
with a key that satisfies H(K)≪ H(Xn)?
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The answer is positive, but it depends on Φ. We denote the Fourier expansion of φi ∈ Φ as
φi =
∑
S⊆[n]
ρi,SχS .
The following result shows that φi is perfectly hidden from Eve if and only if I(χS(X
n);Y n) = 0
for all χS such that ρi,S > 0.
Lemma 6. If I(φi(X
n);Y n) = 0 for all φi ∈ Φ, then I(χS(Xn);Y n) = 0 for all S such that
ρi,S > 0 for some i ∈ [m].
Proof. Assume that I(χS(X
n);Y n) > 0 for a given ρi,S > 0. Then there exists b : Yn → {−1, 1}
such that E [b(Y n)χS(X
n)] = λ > 0. Consequently, from (20), E [b(Y n)φ1(X
n)] ≥ λρi,S > 0, and
φ1(X
n) is not independent of Y n.
The previous result shows that hiding a set of functions perfectly, or even a single function,
might be as hard as hiding Xn. Indeed, if there is a φi ∈ Φ such that E [φi(Xn)XS(Xn)] > 0 for
all S ⊆ [n] where |S|= 1, then perfectly hiding this set of functions can only be accomplished by
using a one-time pad. Nevertheless, if we step back from perfect secrecy, a large class of functions
can be hidden with a comparably small key, as in the next example.
Example 8 (BSC revisited). Let Zn be a sequence of n i.i.d. bits such that Pr{Zi = −1} = ǫ, and
consider once again the one-time pad Y n = Xn ⊗ Zn. Furthermore, denote
Φk = {φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} | E [φ(Xn)χS(Xn)] = 0 ∀|S|< k} .
Let φ ∈ Φk and φ(Xn) =
∑
S:|S|≥k ρSχS(X
n). Then, from Theorem 5 and Corollary 1, for any
bˆ : Yn → {−1, 1},
Pr{φ(Xn) 6= bˆ(Y n)} ≥ 1
2
1−√∑
|S|>T
ρ2S(1− 2ǫ)2|S|

≥ 1
2
(
1− (1− 2ǫ)k
)
.
Consequently, from Lemma 5, I(φ(Xn);Y n) ≤ (1− 2ǫ)k for all φ ∈ Φk. Note that H(Zn) = nh(ǫ),
which can be made very small compared to n. Therefore, even with a small key, a large class of
functions can be almost perfectly hidden from the eavesdropper through this simple one-time pad
scheme. The BSC setting discussed in Example 5 is generalized in the following theorem which, in
turn, is a particular case of the analysis in [45].
Theorem 6 (Generalized One-time Pad). Let Y n = Xn ⊗ Zn, Xn ⊥ Zn, Xn be uniformly
distributed, φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and φ(Xn) = ∑S⊆[n] ρSχS(Xn). We define cS , E [χS(Zn)]
for S ⊆ [n]. Then
I(φ(Xn);Y n) ≤
√∑
S⊆[n]
(cSρS)2. (29)
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In particular, I(φ(Xn);Y n) = 0 if and only if cS = 0 for all S such that ρS 6= 0.
Proof. Let ψ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and ψ(Y n) = ∑S⊆[n] dSχS(Y n). Note that ∑S⊆[n] d2S = 1.
Then
E [φ(Xn)ψ(Y n)] = E [φ(Xn)E [ψ(Y n)|Xn]]
= E
φ(Xn) ∑
S⊆[n]
dSE [χS(Y
n)|Xn]

= E
φ(Xn) ∑
S⊆[n]
dSE [χS(X
n ⊗ Zn)|Xn]

= E
φ(Xn) ∑
S⊆[n]
dSE [χS(X
n)χS(Z
n)|Xn]

=
∑
S⊆[n]
dSE [φ(X
n)χS(X
n)]E [χS(Z
n)]
=
∑
S⊆[n]
dSρScS (30)
≤
√∑
S⊆[n]
(cSρS)2, (31)
where (31) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The inequality (29) then follows from
Lemma 5. Finally, assume there exists S ⊆ [n] such that both cS 6= 0 and ρS 6= 0. Then
setting ψ(Y n) = χS(Y
n), it follows from (30) that E [φ(Xn)ψ(Y n)] = ρScS 6= 0 and, consequently,
I(φ(Xn);Y n) > 0.
6.4 From Symbol Secrecy to Function Secrecy
Symbol secrecy captures the amount of information that an encryption scheme leaks about in-
dividual symbols of a message. A given encryption scheme can achieve a high level of (weak)
information-theoretic security, but low symbol secrecy. As illustrated in Section 4.1, by sending a
constant fraction of the message in the clear, the average amount of information about the plain-
text that leaks relative to the length of the message can be made arbitrarily small, nevertheless the
symbol secrecy performance is always constant (i.e. does not decrease with message length).
When X is uniformly drawn from Fq for which an (n, k, n − k + 1) MDS code exists, then an
absolute symbol secrecy of k/n can always be achieved using the encryption scheme suggested in
Proposition 1. If X is a binary random variable, then we can map sequences of plaintext bits of
length ⌊log2 q⌋ to an appropriate symbol in Fq, and then use the parity check matrix of an MDS
code to achieve a high symbol secrecy. Therefore, we may assume without loss of generality that
Xn is drawn from {−1, 1}n. We also make the assumption that Xn is uniformly distributed. This
can be regarded as an approximation for the distribution of Xn when it is, for example, the output
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of an optimal source encoder with sufficiently large blocklength.
Theorem 7. Let Xn be a uniformly distributed sequence of n bits, Y = Encn(X
n,K), and uǫ and
ǫ∗t the corresponding symbol secrecy and dual symbol secrecy of Encn, defined in (1) and (3), respec-
tively. Furthermore, for φ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} and E [φ(Xn)] = 0, let φ(Xn) =∑S⊆[n] ρSχS(Xn).
Then for any φˆ : Y → {−1, 1}
Pr{φ(Xn) 6= φˆ(Y )} ≥ 1
2
(
1−B|Φ|(ρ,λ)
)
, (32)
where Φ = {χS : ρS 6= 0}, λ(t) , h−1b ((1 − ǫ∗t t)+), λ = {λ(|S|)}S⊆[n] and ρ = {|ρS |}S⊆[n]. In
particular,
Pr{φ(Xn) 6= φˆ(Y )} ≥ 1
2
1−√ ∑
|S|>nµ0
ρ2S
 . (33)
Proof. From the definition of symbol secrecy, for any S ⊆ [n] with |S|= t
I(χS(X
n);Y ) ≤ I(XS ;Y ) ≤ ǫ∗t t,
and, consequently,
H(χS(X
n)|Y ) ≥ (1− ǫ∗t t)+.
From Fano’s inequality, for any binary Fˆ where Y → Fˆ
Pr{χS(Xn) 6= Fˆ} ≥ h−1b ((1− ǫ∗t t)+),
where h−1b : [0, 1] → [0, 1/2] is the inverse of the binary entropy function. In particular, from the
definition of absolute symbol secrecy, if ǫ∗t = 0, then
Pr{χS(Xn) 6= Fˆ} = 1/2 ∀|S|≤ nµ0.
The result then follows directly from Theorem 5, the fact that φ(Xn) =
∑
S⊆[n] ρSχS(X
n) and
letting λ(t) , h−1b ((1 − ǫ∗t t)+).
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss the application of our results to different settings in privacy and cryptog-
raphy.
7.1 The Correlation-Error Product
We momentarily diverge from the cryptographic setting and introduce the error-correlation product
for the privacy setting considered by Calmon and Fawaz in [10]. Let W and X be two random
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variables with joint distribution pW,X . W represents a variable that is supposed to remain private,
while X represents a variable that will be released to an untrusted data collector in order to receive
some utility based on X. The goal is to design a randomized mapping pY |X , called the privacy
assuring mapping, that transforms X into an output Y that will be disclosed to a third party.
The goal of a privacy assuring mechanism is to produce an output Y , derived from X according
to the mapping pY |X , that will be released to the data collector in the place of X. The released
variable Y is chosen such that W cannot be inferred reliably given an observation of Y . Simultane-
ously, given an appropriate distortion metric, X should be close enough to Y so that a certain level
of utility can still be provided. For example, W could be a user’s political preference, and X a set of
movie ratings released to a recommender system in order to receive movie recommendations. Y is
chosen as a perturbed version of the movie recommendations so that the user’s political preference
is obscured, while meaningful recommendations can still be provided.
Given W → X → Y and pW,X , a privacy assuring mapping is given by the conditional distribu-
tion pY |X . The choice of pY |X determines the tradeoff between privacy and utility. If pY |X = pY ,
then perfect privacy is achieved (i.e. W and Y are independent), but no utility can be provided.
Conversely, if pY |X is the identity mapping, then no privacy is gained, but the highest level of
utility can be provided.
WhenW = φ(X) where φ ∈ L2(pX), the bounds from Section 6.1 shed light on the fundamental
privacy-utility tradeoff. Returning to the notation of Section 6.1, let W = φ(X) be correlated with
a set of functions Φ = {φi}mi=1. The next result is a direct corollary of Theorem 5.
Corollary 2. Let E [Wφi(X)] = ρi,
∑|Φ|
i=1 ρ
2
i = 1, ψi(Y ) = E [φi(X)|Y ] and, for i 6= j, E [φi(X)φj(X)] =
0 and E [ψi(Y )ψj(Y )] = 0. Then
mmse(W |Y ) =
|Φ|∑
i=1
mmse(φi(Y )|X)ρ2i . (34)
We call the product mmse(φi(Y )|X)ρ2i the error-correlation product. The secret variable W
cannot be estimated with low MMSE from Y if and only if the functions φi that are strongly
correlated with W (i.e. large ρ2i ) cannot be estimated reliably. Consequently, if ρi is large and
φi is relevant for the utility provided by the data collector, privacy cannot be achieved without a
significant loss of utility: mmse(φi(X)|Y ) is necessarily large if mmse(W |Y ) is large. Conversely, in
order to hide W , it is sufficient to hide the functions φi(X) that are strongly correlated with φ(X).
This no-free-lunch result is intuitive, since one would expect that privacy cannot be achieved if
utility is based on data that is strongly correlated with the private variables. The results presented
here prove that this is indeed the case.
We present next a general description of a two-phase secure communication scheme for the
threat model described in Section 1.5, presented in terms of the list-source code constructions
derived using linear codes. Note that this scheme can be easily extended to any list-source code
by using the corresponding encoding/decoding functions instead of multiplication by parity check
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matrices.
7.2 A Secure Communication Scheme Based on List-Source Codes
We assume that Alice and Bob have access to a symmetric-key encryption/decryption scheme
(Enc′,Dec′) that is used with the shared secret key K and is sufficiently secure against the adver-
sary. This scheme can be, for example, a one-time pad. The encryption/decryption procedure is
performed as follows, and will be used as components of the overall encryption scheme (Enc,Dec)
described below.
Scheme 2. Input : The source encoded sequence x ∈ Fnq , parity check matrix H of a linear code in
Fnq , a full-rank k×n matrix D such that rank([HT DT ]) = n, and encryption/decryption functions
(Enc′,Dec′). We assume both Alice and Bob share a secret key K.
Encryption (Enc):
Phase I (pre-caching): Alice generates σ = Hx and sends to Bob.2
Phase II (send encrypted data): Alice generates e = Enc′(Dx,K) and sends to Bob.
Decryption (Dec): Bob calculates Dec′(e,K) = Dx and recovers x from σ and Dx.
Assuming that (Enc′,Dec′) is secure, the information-theoretic security of Scheme 2 reduces
to the security of the underlying list-source code (i.e. Scheme 1). In practice, the encryp-
tion/decryption functions (Enc′,Dec′) may depend on a secret or public/private key, as long as
it provide sufficient security for the desired application. In addition, assuming that the source
sequence is uniform and i.i.d. in Fnq , we can use MDS codes to make strong security guarantees,
as described in the next section. In this case, an adversary that observes σ cannot infer any
information about any set of k symbols of the original message.
Note that this scheme has a tunable level of secrecy: The amount of data sent in phase I and
phase II can be appropriately selected to match the properties of the encryption scheme available,
the size of the key length, and the desired level of secrecy. Furthermore, when the encryption
procedure has a higher computational cost than the list-source encoding/decoding operations, list-
source codes can be used to reduce the total number of operations required by allowing encryption
of a smaller portion of the message (phase II).
The protocol outline presented in Scheme 2 is useful in different practical scenarios, which are
discussed in the following sections. Most of the advantages of the suggested scheme stem from
the fact that list-source codes are key-independent, allowing content to be distributed when a key
distribution infrastructure is not yet established, and providing an additional level of security if
keys are compromised before phase II in Scheme 2.
2Here, Alice can use message authentication codes and public key encryption to augment security. Furthermore,
the list-source coding scheme can be used as an additional layer of security with information-theoretic guarantees in
symmetric-key ciphers. Since we are interested in the information-theoretic security properties of the scheme, we will
not go into further details. We do recognize that in order to use this scheme in practice additional steps are needed
to meet modern cryptographic standards.
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7.3 Content pre-caching
As hinted earlier, list-source codes provide a secure mechanism for content pre-caching when a key
infrastructure has not yet been established. A large fraction of the data can be list-source coded and
securely transmitted before the termination of the key distribution protocol. This is particularly
significant in large networks with hundreds of mobile nodes, where key management protocols can
require a significant amount of time to complete [46]. Scheme 2 circumvents the communication
delays incurred by key compromise detection, revocation and redistribution by allowing data to be
efficiently distributed concurrently with the key distribution protocol, while maintaining a level of
security determined by the underlying list-source code.
7.4 Application to key distribution protocols
List-source codes can also provide additional robustness to key compromise. If the secret key is
compromised before phase II of Scheme 2, the data will still be as secure as the underlying list-source
code. Even if a (computationally unbounded) adversary has perfect knowledge of the key, until
the last part of the data is transmitted the best he can do is reduce the number of possible inputs
to an exponentially large list. In contrast, if a stream cipher based on a pseudo-random number
generator were used and the initial seed was leaked to an adversary, all the data transmitted up
to the point where the compromise was detected would be vulnerable. The use of list-source codes
provide an additional, information-theoretic level of security to the data up to the point where the
last fraction of the message is transmitted. This also allows decisions as to which receivers will be
allowed to decrypt the data can be delayed until the very end of the transmission, providing more
time for detection of unauthorized receivers and allowing a larger flexibility in key distribution.
In addition, if the level of security provided by the list-source code is considered sufficient and the
key is compromised before phase II, the key can be redistributed without the need of retransmitting
the entire data. As soon as the keys are reestablished, the transmitter simply encrypts the remaining
part of the data in phase II with the new key.
7.5 Additional layer of security
We also highlight that list-source codes can be used to provide an additional layer of security
to the underlying encryption scheme. The message can be list-source coded after encryption and
transmitted in two phases, as in Scheme 2. As argued in the previous point, this provides additional
robustness against key compromise, in particular when a compromised key can reveal a large amount
of information about an incomplete message (e.g. stream ciphers). Consequently, list-source codes
are a simple, practical way of augmenting the security of current encryption schemes.
One example application is to combine list-source codes with stream ciphers. The source-coded
message can be initially encrypted using a pseudorandom number generator (PRG) initialized with
a randomly selected seed, and then list-source coded. The initial random seed would be part of the
encrypted message sent in the final transmission phase. This setup has the advantage of augmenting
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the security of the underlying stream cipher, and provides randomization to the list-source coded
message. In particular, if the LSC is based on MDS codes and assuming that the distribution of the
plaintext is nearly uniform, strong information-theoretic symbol secrecy guarantees can be made
about the transmitted data, as discussed in Section 2. Even if the underlying PRG is compromised,
the message would still be secure.
7.6 Tunable level of secrecy
List-source codes provide a tunable level of secrecy, i.e. the amount of security provided by the
scheme can be adjusted according to the application of interest. This can be done by appropriately
selecting the size of the list (L) of the underlying code, which determines the amount of uncertainty
an adversary will have regarding the input message. In the proposed implementation using linear
codes, this corresponds to choosing the size of the parity check matrix H, or, analogously, the
parameters of the underlying error-correcting code. In terms of Scheme 2, a larger (respectively
smaller) value of L will lead to a smaller (larger) list-source coded message in phase I and a larger
(smaller) encryption burden in phase II.
8 Conclusions
We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions. We introduce the concept of LSCs,
which are codes that compress a source below its entropy rate. We derived fundamental bounds for
the rate list region, and provided code constructions that achieve these bounds. List-source codes
are a useful tool for understanding how to perform encryption when the (random) key length is
smaller than the message entropy. When the key is small, we can reduce an adversary’s uncertainty
to a near-uniformly distributed list of possible source sequences with an exponential (in terms of the
key length) number of elements by using list-source codes. We also demonstrated how list-source
codes can be implemented using standard linear codes.
Furthermore, we presented a new information-theoretic metric of secrecy, namely ǫ-symbol
secrecy, which characterizes the amount of information leaked about specific symbols of the source
given an encoded version of the message. We derived fundamental bounds for ǫ-symbol secrecy,
and showed how these bounds can be achieved using MDS codes when the source is uniformly
distributed.
We also introduced results for bounding the probability that an adversary correctly guesses a
predicate of the plaintext in terms of the symbol secrecy achieved by the underlying encryption
scheme. These results are based on Lemma 3, which, in turn, was used to derive bounds on
the information leakage of a security system that does not achieve perfect secrecy. These bounds
provide insight on how to design symmetric-key encryption schemes that hide specific functions of
the data, where uncertainty is captured in terms of minimum-mean squared error. These results
also shed light on the fundamental privacy-utility tradeoff in privacy systems.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3
For fixed a,b ∈ Rn where ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0, let zP : Rn → R and zD : Rn → R be given by
zP (y) , a
Ty,
zD(u) , a
Tb+ uTb+ ‖u‖2.
Furthermore, we define A(a) , {u ∈ Rn|u ≥ a} and B(b) , {y ∈ Rn | ‖y‖2≤ 1,y ≤ b}.
The optimal value zn(a,b) is given by the following pair of primal-dual convex programs:
zn(a,b) = max
y∈B(b)
zP (y) = min
u∈A(a)
zD(u).
Assume, without loss of generality, that b1/a1 ≤ b2/a2 ≤ . . . ≤ bn/an, and let k∗ be defined in (13).
Let cj ,
√
(1−
∑j
i=1 b
2
i )
‖a‖2
2
−
∑j
i=1 a
2
i
. Note that since
∑k∗
i=1 b
2
i < 1, we have ck∗ > 0. In addition, let
y∗ = (b1, . . . , bk∗ , ak∗+1ck∗ , . . . , anck∗)
and
u∗ = (−b1/ck∗ , . . . ,−bk∗/ck∗ ,−ak∗+1, . . . ,−an).
From the definition of k∗, y∗ ∈ B(b) and u∗ ∈ A(a). Furthermore,
zP (y
∗) = aTy∗
=
k∗∑
i=1
aibi +
n∑
i=k∗+1
ck∗a
2
i
=
k∗∑
i=1
aibi +
√√√√(‖a‖22− k∗∑
i=1
a2i
)(
1−
k∗∑
i=1
b2i
)
, (35)
and
zD(u
∗) =aTb+ u∗Tb+ ‖u∗‖2
35
=
k∗∑
i=1
(
aibi − b
2
i
ck∗
)
+ c−1k∗
√√√√ k∗∑
i=1
b2i + c
2
k∗
(
‖a‖22−
k∗∑
i=1
a2i
)
=
k∗∑
i=1
aibi + c
−1
k∗
(
1−
k∗∑
i=1
b2i
)
=
k∗∑
i=1
aibi +
√√√√(‖a‖22− k∗∑
i=1
a2i
)(
1−
k∗∑
i=1
b2i
)
=zP (y
∗).
Since both the primal and the dual achieve the same value at y∗ and u∗, respectively, it follows
that the value zP (y
∗) given in (35) is optimal.
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